PEOPLE v. FAGAN, 66 N.Y.2d 815 (1985)

489 N.E.2d 222, 498 N.Y.S.2d 335

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. ALONZO FAGAN, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of the State of New York.Argued October 17, 1985
Decided November 14, 1985

Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, Donald J. Mark, J.

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Edward J. Nowak, Public Defender (Brian Shiffrin of counsel), for appellant.

Howard R. Relin, District Attorney (Melvin Bressler and Michael J. Nelson of counsel), for respondent.

MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

The courts below properly found that the dismissal, at the conclusion of a final parole revocation hearing of charges lodged against the defendant, did not bar a later prosecution of criminal charges based on the same acts. Collateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine, not to be applied automatically just because its formal prerequisites are me (Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 292). Strong policy considerations militate against giving issues determined in prior litigation preclusive effect in a criminal case, and indeed we have never done so (see, People v Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 65, n 4). The correct determination of guilt or innocence is paramount in criminal cases (People v Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 345), and the People’s incentive to litigate in a felony prosecution would presumably be stronger than in a parole revocation proceeding (cf. Gilberg v Barbieri, supra).

We have examined defendant’s other contention and found it to be without merit.

Chief Judge WACHTLER and Judges JASEN, MEYER, SIMONS, KAYE, ALEXANDER and TITONE concur.

Order affirmed in a memorandum.

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